SUPPLEMENTAL VIEWS OF ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON

I am writing to make supplemental recommendations and to differ with parts of the Final Report of the House Members of the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress. However, I agree with most of the recommendations and want to begin by indicating why I believe that, judged in context, the recommendations, if enacted, would represent an important step forward for the Congress.

VIEWS ON THE RECOMMENDATIONS

I believe that the Joint Committee's recommendations would make a substantial contribution to reform. Perhaps equally important, I believe that many of these recommendations have a good chance of being enacted by the House because they take account of the real political world in which Congress operates today. Many members of the Committee were keenly mindful of the record of past Joint Committees commissioned to reform the Congress in 1945 and 1965 and of testimony we received from some of their Members concerning the difficulty of translating their recommendations into political reality. The present recommendations must be understood in the context of a history mostly of failure of Joint Committee recommendations to be enacted. Past efforts have been excellent and thoughtful but have not always fully considered the complicated, cacophonous partisanship that has been the hallmark of the United States Congress. This Committee has tried to learn from rather than repeat the history of past Joint Committee efforts. Nevertheless, our recommendations, though sometimes less cosmic, are expansive and would change the way the House operates in significant ways that respond directly to explicit public concerns.

The mission of the Joint Committee would have been challenging under any circumstances. Reforming Congress always raises many matters below the surface of the issues, practices, and procedures under review. However, the work of the present Committee was especially daunting.

This Joint Committee was appointed in the wake of public concern that Congress did not hold itself to high enough standards and some exasperation with ``gridlock'' that had resulted from the polarized atmosphere that had characterized recent congressional sessions. For the House members, Chairman Lee Hamilton deserves extraordinary credit for fashioning a consensus on the major issues that appear to have most concerned the public when the committee was formed -- Congressional ethics and compliance by Members with the laws Congress applies to others. This Report recommends that to be professional and objective, investigations of alleged ethics violations should not be performed by Members of Congress but by private citizens, who themselves must be shown to have no conflict of interest and to be independent of Congress. These independent fact-finders would be appointed jointly by the Speaker and the Minority Leader for each Congress. Members would retain ultimate responsibility for assuring that ethics violations are sanctioned, but their decisions would be driven by evidence objectively compiled.

We also have agreed that Congress and its instrumentalities should be brought under the laws Congress enacts, thus continuing action already begun that has applied to Congress such laws as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The present House and Senate Offices of Fair Employment Practices would be replaced with a joint Office of Compliance that would use independent hearing officers who would not be employed by the Legislative Branch. Further, recourse to the Federal appellate courts would be available. The new Office would also study all the laws of the United States and, where applicable, recommend that Congress be further covered.

These two issues are probably the most important the Joint Committee considered because they go directly to the confidence the public has in the institution itself. Less visible to the public and less basic in character were issues of procedural reform that are important to the functioning of the Congress. Almost inevitably in the Committee, these issues became vehicles for the same partisan debate that takes up the time of the House each day and thus could not always be resolved in a Committee composed of equal numbers of Democrats and Republicans. However, we have recommended many significant procedural reforms, among them biennial budgeting, expansion of the House legislative week from three to four days, and restrictions on unauthorized appropriations. Further procedural reforms will depend upon bipartisan coalition-building that serves a diverse democracy best.

SUGGESTIONS AND ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS

All of my suggestions and additions concern the District of Columbia, except one, which concerns the effect of one of the Joint Committee's recommendations on the goal of diversity in House leadership. Almost all these suggestions are non-controversial.

Impact of Recommendation I.2 on the Committee on the District of Columbia

Recommendation I.2 [section 102 of the House bill] would have the unintended effect of abolishing the Committee on the District of Columbia and leaving the Congress with no appropriate vehicle for carrying out its plenary jurisdiction over the District of Columbia under Article I, section 8, clause 17 of the Constitution. (See also Recommendation I.3, below)

In recommendation I.2, regarding the maximum number of committee and subcommittee assignments, the Joint Committee seeks to limit Members' assignments to two standing committees and four subcommittees in order to enable Members to give more attention to committee' matters. A waiver of the limitation would require both the recommendation of the respective party caucus and the consent of the House, whereas presently the consent of the caucus alone is required. The Joint Committee recommends an exemption only for service on the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct. The rationale for this exemption explicitly relates to the difficulty of getting members to serve on that committee. I do not recall whether a discussion took place concerning exemptions based on this rationale. However, I believe that most members of the Committee and of Congress would agree that, based on this reasoning, the District of Columbia Committee should also be an exempt committee. The difficulty of getting Members to serve on a committee that has nothing to do with national or Federal business but relates uniquely to the local affairs of one congressional district is clear and has been abundantly demonstrated for years. The absence of an exemption for service on the District Committee would completely discourage Members from seeking to be assigned, since this is a committee that offers absolutely no tangible benefits to the constituents of any Member other than the Delegate from the District.

The House Democratic Caucus has always acknowledged and accounted for this problem by allowing an exemption for District Committee service. The Joint Committee did not consider and, I believe, did not intend to abolish the District Committee. Further, for the Delegate from the District of Columbia, the proposed limitation would present a unique hardship. Should no exemption be provided, the Delegate, who, of course, must serve on the committee pertaining to her district, could serve only on one committee that deals with Federal matters, the major mission of the United States Congress. This recommendation therefore unintentionally discriminates against the residents of the District of Columbia, who would be left with inadequate representation on House committees compared with the constituents of other House Members.

Recommendation I.2 was adopted without any consideration of its effect on the District of Columbia Committee. Its adoption without exemption for the District Committee, when combined with Recommendation I.3, which is discussed below, would abolish the District Committee. To avoid a result that I do not believe the Joint Committee intended, an exemption for District Committee service would be necessary.

Impact of Recommendation I.3 on the Committee on the District of Columbia

Just as limitation to two committees without an exemption for the District of Columbia Committee would abolish the Committee, so also would Recommendation I.3, which provides that ``if the membership of any standing Committee falls below fifty percent of its membership at the end of the 103d Congress, the Committee on Rules shall consider a resolution which would eliminate that committee and transfer its jurisdiction to one or more standing committees.''

Until statehood or virtually complete self-government for the District of Columbia is achieved, the House could not allow the abolition of the District Committee without destroying home rule as well as abdicating Congress' plenary jurisdiction over the District of Columbia. Moreover, assigning District matters to a subcommittee of a larger committee would not be an appropriate alternative because this option would invite Members of the larger committee to interfere with the incomplete self-government the District does have, if history as well as recent events are any guide. After all, most Members would seek places on the larger committee for reasons having nothing to do with the District, and some would certainly be tempted to vote as their constituents would, not as District of Columbia residents and officials have indicated. An intolerable and unintended intrusion would occur because of a structural change in the number of committees.

The Senate, of course, has a Subcommittee on General Services, Federalism, and the District of Columbia, but neither the Subcommittee nor the full Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs engages in regular oversight of the District of Columbia. Instead of holding its own hearings on District matters, the Senate subcommittee relies on the work of the House District Committee and sends Subcommittee staff to District Committee hearings. This synergy between the House and Senate on District matters is an excellent example of comity and efficiency, especially considering that the District is a separate jurisdiction which, but for existing law, does not require oversight. At the same time, the dependence almost exclusively on the House for District matters makes it necessary to maintain the District Committee in order for Congress to meet its constitutional obligations.

Recommendation I.3, permitting abolition of a committee that falls below 5O percent of its membership at the end of the 103d Congress, especially when coupled with Recommendation I.2, limiting membership to two committees, would abolish the District Committee and leave the Congress with no vehicle to carry out its Constitutional responsibility. It follows that an exemption to these recommendations for the District of Columbia Committee would be necessary in order for the District Committee to be maintained and to attract Members.

Recommendation to Use Expanded District Home Rule Legislation to Eliminate the Appropriations Subcommittee on the District of Columbia

The Joint Committee decided to avoid the political thicket associated with directly recommending the abolition of committees and instead to seek abolition indirectly by limiting service to two committees and relying on the natural attrition that necessarily would follow. However, elimination of the Appropriations Subcommittee on the District of Columbia could be accomplished through simple, already pending legislation and should proceed forthwith. The District of Columbia Legislative and Budget Autonomy Act, currently H.R. 2071, which has been introduced annually for years in the House would be the appropriate vehicle. The Appropriations Subcommittee on the District of Columbia exists only because of a redundant and wasteful process requiring extensive oversight and House votes on the disposition of locally raised revenues. The District's annual budget, comprised mainly of taxes and funds from locally-raised revenues, must be submitted to Congress each year for approval. The Mayor submits the budget (required by law to be balanced) to the District of Columbia Council, and the Council holds extensive and thorough hearings on every aspect of the budget. Once the Council adopts the budget, however, the Mayor must then submit it to the President of the United States, who then transmits it to Congress.

At this point the same review process that already has taken place at the local level is repeated in the Congress by both the House and the Senate Appropriations Subcommittees on the District of Columbia. The House Subcommittee holds hearings on the budget, during which the same individuals who testified before the District of Columbia Council are called to provide the same information already given to the Council to Congress. This repetitious review of local finances is perhaps that most complete waste of the time and money of any process of the United States Congress. It also grievously hampers and prolongs the city's budget process, requiring twice the lead time that would otherwise be necessary, and making accurate budgeting virtually impossible and budget instability almost inevitable.

Twenty years ago, when home rule legislation was being considered by the Congress, the Senate bill did not require the District of Columbia budget to be submitted to the Congress. The Mayor had only to submit it to the Council in a manner similar to that of every jurisdiction in the United States, including the four territories. However, unlike the Senate bill, the House version required submission of the District's budget to the Congress for approval, and a compromise had to be struck. Today, the occasion of a rare Joint Committee overhaul of Congress provides the opportunity to eliminate a Subcommittee, which experience has indicated is clearly unnecessary, to save funds and the valuable time of Members, and to correct the affront to American democracy that comes with congressional oversight of locally-raised revenue. (The portion of the District's annual budget that does come from Federal sources might be handled by the existing House and Senate subcommittees with related jurisdiction, such as the House Subcommittee on Treasury-Postal and General Government.)

A less sweeping action but one that would result in considerable savings and efficiency for the Congress would be the elimination of the requirement that local laws passed by the Council of the District of Columbia be held over by Congress for a period of time (30 and 60 legislative days for civil and criminal acts, respectively) prior to taking effect. This provision, like budget autonomy, has been pending in the House for years, and is also a part of H.R. 2071, the District of Columbia Legislative and Budget Autonomy Act of 1993.

Currently, a locally-enacted law does not take effect until the act (pertaining to purely local, non-federal matters) is transmitted to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Majority Leader of the Senate, and is left to sit in Congress for 30 or 60 legislative days. However, this time period endures for months because congressional recess days do not count. This ``layover'' period causes major disruptions in the government operations of the District, often necessitating emergency and temporary legislation as stopgap measures.

Staff of the District Committee must handle the chores connected with processing every District of Columbia piece of legislation, even alley closings, and must provide for full-scale hearings if any Member of the House files a resolution of disapproval. Staff must be rigorous in keeping track of the 30 and 6) legislative days because of the ramifications of a disapproval resolution. A reduction in staff of the District Committee could occur if this redundant, wasteful, and inefficient process that is also an assault on democracy were eliminated, as the District of Columbia Legislative and Budget Autonomy Act of 1993 would accomplish.

Therefore, the District of Columbia Legislative and Budget Autonomy Act should be enacted because of the efficiency and savings which would result through the elimination of the House and Senate Appropriations Subcommittees on the District of Columbia, the reduction in staff of the House District Committee that would be possible, and the gains to democratic self-government that would result.

Impact of Recommendations I.2 and I.3 on African-American Members of the House

I want to incorporate the important views of the Chair of the Congressional Black Caucus, as contained on the following page, into my own supplemental views.

Eleanor Holmes Norton.

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Letter from the Congressional Black Caucus

H2-334, House Annex 2,
Washington, DC 20515,
November 10, 1993.

The Honorable Lee Hamilton, Chairman,
Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress,
H2-175D Ford House Office Building,
Washington, DC 20515.

Dear Mr. Chairman: I write to express the serious concern of the Congressional Black Caucus regarding proposals which would impose limitations on assignments of Members to Committees, and as a potential consequence, force the elimination of Committees of particular importance to and impact upon minority communities. The pending proposed action would diminish the presence of African-Americans within the leadership of the House of Representatives and its Committee system, at a point when minorities are just beginning to qualify. We respectfully request that consideration of Section 102 be postponed from the mark-up scheduled for Tuesday, November 16th until we might have an opportunity to consult immediately and directly with you and House Leadership. Please contact me at your earliest possible opportunity in reference to this request.

Sincerely,

Kweisi Mfume, Chairman.