ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF GERALD B. SOLOMON

The central test of any congressional reform proposal is whether it improves the ability of the Congress to represent the People and legislate in their best interest.

That the Congress is currently failing this test under its existing structures, operations and procedures is more than borne out in independent critiques by congressional scholars and in public opinion polls measuring the job approval rating of Congress.

The accuracy of these critiques and perceptions of Congress is further bolstered by the surveys and testimony of Members themselves and the fact that they saw fit to create a Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress to remedy its shortcomings.

Unfortunately, the recommendations of the Joint Committee, while resolving some of Congress's failings, still fall far short of its mandate to reorganize, modernize and restore the Congress as the People's Branch of Government.

Why has the Joint Committee fallen short of the mark? We are told that ``the perfect is enemy of the good,'' and that we should refrain from advancing bold reform proposals because they would have no chance of passing. Such an assessment, in my opinion, underestimates what Members want and what the People demand, and that is a fundamental change in the way we operate.

If the Joint Committee were true to its charge, it would present the Congress with its best judgment of what needs to be done to make the institution work better -- not simply with what it thinks will be least offensive to a majority of Members.

Let the Joint Committee's best judgments be put to the test of full and open deliberation at the committee and floor stages of the process so that the Congress can work its will on a comprehensive rather than limited set of reform proposals.

But, to begin with a diluted, politically pragmatic approach only invites derision, division and indecision. If the Joint Committee cannot put forward a bold reform package of which its members can be proud, how can it expect to attract the enthusiasm and support of the rest of the Congress, let alone the public and the media?

The central failing of Congress today is its inability to act as a responsive and deliberative policy-making body. The reason for this failing is its fragmented, unrepresentative and unaccountable structures and processes.

While there have been ad hoc attempts in the House to compensate for these failings with leadership task forces and ``structured amendment'' procedures that protect committee products from real scrutiny or change, these efforts at recentralization only exacerbate the unrepresentative and unaccountable nature of the institution and thereby contribute to the continuing decline of public confidence in the Congress.

Put another way, the present policy-making process in the House is end-loaded, and that only makes for bad policy and an abrasive drag on the machinery of law-making.

What is needed instead, if we are to truly reform and restore the legislative machinery, is a front-end realignment. This means beginning with the committee system:

• realigning committee jurisdictions along more functional and rational lines to eliminate duplication, overlap and joint bill referrals;

• reducing committees, subcommittees and staff;

• reducing Member committee and subcommittee assignments; and

• establishing committee procedures that will ensure maximum participation and deliberation by members.

The Joint Committee has gone part way in this respect by reducing the number of subcommittees and Member committee and subcommittee assignments. But it has failed abysmally by not addressing committee sizes, numbers and jurisdictions, and by not eliminating such phantom legislative devices as one-third quorums and proxy voting. Moreover, it has rejected proposals to ensure that committees and subcommittees reflect the party composition of the House and are therefore more representative of the whole.

If committees are downsized, reorganized, streamlined and made more representative and deliberative, over half the battle will be won since their legislative products will in turn be more representative and acceptable to the House and the public.

The second stage of the process, floor consideration, should no longer need the cover of ``restrictive rules'' which limit the ability of Members to fully represent their constituents by offering amendments. Restoring an open amendment process on the House floor will not be the chaotic disaster some fear if committees are once again allowed to do their work properly. The committee product will once again be respected and accepted.

Finally, the greatest thing that can be done to complete this process of reform is to renew House respect for and adherence to the standing rules of the House. In recent years, special rules for individual bills have increasingly altered, waived and otherwise circumvented the standing rules adopted by a majority of the House at the beginning of the Congress.

This frequent departure from the standing rules has undermined all respect for the regular order and in its place established a lawless approach to law-making -- a procedural vigilantism under which each piece of legislation is considered under its own self-justifying procedures as a law unto itself.

If the Congress ever hopes to restore public faith in it as a law-making body, it must begin by following its own laws and rules when it comes to making those laws -- without exception! House rules are designed both to permit the majority to work its will and to protect the rights of political minorities in the process.

As Jefferson advised in his Manual of Parliamentary Practice:

It is much more material that there should be a rule to go by than what that rule is; that there may be a uniformity of proceeding in business not subject to the caprice of the Speaker of captiousness of the members. It is very material that order, decency, and regularity be preserved in a dignified public body.

Put another way, when there is a departure from the regular order, there follows a deterioration of comity and mutual respect from within the institution, and this translates into a decline in public confidence in Congress from without.

One of the greatest contributions the Joint Committee could make would be to reaffirm the importance of adhering to the established rules and order so that the House can focus its full energies on producing the best laws possible for the country, rather than dissipating those energies on fights over procedural abuses that generate enmity rather than comity.

How our laws are made has every bit as much to do with public respect for Congress as what those laws are, since it is the process that often determines the quality, effectiveness and acceptance of those laws. Unfortunately, the Joint Committee has failed to fully appreciate or deal with this breakdown in procedural regularity and comity that is so essential to the proper functioning of the institution.

Gerald B. Solomon.