The Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress conducted 8 days of hearings between April 20 and May 13, 1993, on the issue of committee structure. No other issue explored by the Joint Committee commanded as many days of hearings and as many witness appearances -- 48 witnesses testified, seven of whom were not current Members. Of the 23 House committees (the 22 standing committees plus the House Select Intelligence Committee), 15 were represented; 12 Chairmen and 11 Ranking Minority Members appeared. For eight committees, both the Chairman and the Ranking Minority Member testified. Additionally, two defunct select committees were represented by the former Chairman and/or Ranking Minority Member. In contrast, of the 20 Senate committees (the 17 standing committees plus three select/special committees), 6 were represented; 6 Chairmen and 3 Ranking Minority Members testified. Both the Chairman and the Ranking Minority Member of two committees gave personal testimony. SUMMARY OF HEARINGS ON COMMITTEE STRUCTURE
The first witness, Daniel P. Mulhollan, Acting Deputy Librarian, Library of Congress, stated the task of the Joint Committee with respect to the committee structure:
``[The Joint Committee must determine] whether there is in fact a systemic problem with the committee system. If the Joint Committee determines that the committee system is basically sound and needs nothing more than fine tuning, its focus might include such issues as . . . . If more radical changes appear to be appropriate, then the Joint Committee may wish to consider the following questions . . . .'' 15Mr. Mulhollan also presented a CRS report outlining 14 jurisdictional reorganization options, requested by the Joint Committee, ``to serve as a starting point for discussion of possible committee reorganization options and jurisdictional realignments.'' 16
The witnesses gave profoundly different testimony. Many argued for only minor adjustments; such testimony was typified by Representative John Dingell, Chairman of the Energy and Commerce Committee, who on April 29 suggested that the committee system needs no wholesale restructuring and procedural reform; the gridlock that the public disdains stems from ``matters on which there is no consensus or matters on which there is great division amongst the people and inside the Congress . . . .'' 17 In marked contrast were several who urged drastic change; Representative Butler Derrick on May 13 offered a radical plan to address what he believed is the problem of disjointedness. ``My testimony will be brief. I think we ought to do away with the Ways and Means Committee, we ought to do away with the Appropriations Committee, and we ought to do away with the Budget Committee, and I think we should consolidate them into one committee . . . and that committee should write the budget.'' 18 Most witnesses fell between these two extremes. In short, the Joint Committee heard from a vast number of witnesses whose suggestions for committee reform ranged from modest proposals to almost draconian propositions.
Themes of reform were easily discernible in the testimonies. Some topics, such as a reduction in the number of committee assignments, commanded a near consensus; while others, notably jurisdictional changes, clearly presented a morass of conflicting opinions. Also, several reform subjects were repeatedly mentioned by many witnesses; in this area fall jurisdictions, committee sizes, and committee assignments. Conversely, other topics received scant attention. While concrete reform proposals clearly constituted the bulk of testimony, the more philosophical and perhaps ethereal concept of the enhancement of deliberative democracy was also an evident theme but one that was not discussed at length.
Witnesses who testified on committee size unanimously recommended reduction in size; and these witnesses were frequently the ones who had also proposed reducing committee assignments. These two themes often went hand in hand; and as with committee assignments, witnesses generally urged reduction in size without specific recommendations. Chairman after Chairman recited a history of growth in the size of their committees and attested to the inefficiencies and unwieldiness of large panels. Representative Henry Gonzalez, Chairman of the Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs Committee, made this point in his testimony of April 29:
``Fifty-one members presently serve on what is one of the largest committees in the House. I often describe the Banking Committee as one half of the U.S. Senate plus one. While I recognize the Speaker's prerogative to negotiate committee sizes, I would strongly [recommend] that serious consideration be given to limiting the number of members assigned to various committees and reducing the size of some of the larger committees. My point is illustrated by the fact that five of the committee's subcommittees are too large to utilize our two subcommittee hearing rooms.'' 19The Senate witnesses expressed the same frustrations as their House colleagues on the issue of committee size. The testimony of Senator Dale Bumpers on May 11 captured the mood: ``[W]e all know this place needs a major overhaul. First let me say that the overhaul in my opinion needs to be first of all in the size of committees. The committees are entirely too large . . . . So in my opinion we could cut all of our committees . . . and I promise you . . . we would all be better prepared and serve our constituents better.'' 20
Limitations on Committee and Subcommittee Assignments
Generally, witnesses who addressed the issue of committee assignments urged the Joint Committee to reduce the number of allowable committee and subcommittee assignments and to take action to proscribe the waiving of such limitations as is the current practice. While some witnesses recommended precise assignment limitations, most gave a general endorsement of reduced assignments without specificity. Witnesses acknowledged that Members are spread too thin in their committee duties, and with fewer assignments not only would efficiency increase but also the deliberative function would be enhanced.
Representative Dan Rostenkowski, Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee, who otherwise urged the Joint Committee to go slow in its proposals, on April 22 recommended decreasing committee size and limiting the number of assignments. ``I believe this is an instance where the interests of the individual members and the House coincide. We would all gain if the size of the committees and the number of subcommittees would be reduced.'' 21 Testifying on April 27, Senator Patrick Leahy, Chairman of the Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry Committee, agreed that Senators serve on far too many panels: ``There isn't a single Member of the Senate, myself included, who has not served on more committees and subcommittees than they can really give the attention to they deserve. If we all cut back, we would also find a lot of these duplicative subcommittees, and even duplicative committees, would disappear as we withdrew and we would have a better and more efficient and more effective Senate. Our lives would be better. The country would be better served, and I think the image, speaking just for the Senate now, I think the image of the Senate would be better.'' 22
Although admitting that he was not one to support ``radical changes,'' 23 Representative Sonny Montgomery, Chairman of the Veterans' Affairs Committee, on May 6 urged the adoption of a specific reform, namely that ``members should serve on no more than two committees and no more than five subcommittees.'' 24 In conformity with his major committee realignment plan, Representative Butler Derrick in his May 13 testimony proposed each Member be limited to one committee assignment.
Both the House and the Senate have rules which limit the number of committees and subcommittees on which a Member may serve. However, Joint Committee members and witnesses expressed frustration with the automatic waivers granted to these rules by both Chambers. The May 18 dialogue between Joint Committee Co-Chairman Boren and Senate Parliamentarian Alan Frumin captured the essence of the waiver situation. Parliamentarian Frumin testified, ``I am not sure there is a way of preventing the Senate . . . from adopting waivers. The rules do limit the number of committees that Senators serve on. It does take an act of the Senate, the adoption of a Senate resolution, to grant a waiver. So the processes are there.'' 25 After some discussion, Chairman Boren asked, ``So really we are just talking about not so much a change of the rule but just a will to enforce the rule?'' to which Mr. Frumin replied, ``I think that is accurate.'' 26
Clearly, jurisdictional questions were addressed more often than any other theme. Witnesses generally approached this issue from the perspective of their own committees. The Chairmen and Ranking Minority Members impressed upon the Joint Committee to preserve, and in some cases enlarge, the jurisdictions of their respective committees. Often cited was the need to prohibit appropriators from treading on the domain of the authorizers, and the benefit incurred from assuring a more equal workload among the committees. Representative Jan Meyers, Ranking Minority Member of the House Small Business Committee, stated on April 22, ``I believe the Small Business Committee should be retained with its legislative and investigative jurisdiction substantially and appropriately broadened.'' 27 Senator Jay Rockefeller, Chairman of the Veterans' Affairs Committee, on April 27 pointedly stated, ``In this case, I am fighting for the Senate Veterans' Affairs Committee.'' 28 Later on May 4, Senator Daniel Inouye, Chairman of the Indian Affairs Committee, cited historical and moral imperatives for retaining his panel as a standing committee of the Senate. Chairman Gerry Studds of House Merchant Marine and Fisheries testified on April 29:
``If there were one shred of evidence that doing away with the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee would end the gridlock that has so infuriated the people of the country or make us more effective or get us where we want to be, I would be the first to board up the doors and gleefully lead my fellow committee members out of business. But I would suggest to you that the clear evidence is to the contrary and in fact I think we can make a pretty compelling case that the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee is a model committee and a stellar example around here of how this place ought to operate.'' 29Members who were the former Chairmen or Ranking Minority Members of the defunct House select committees argued for their resuscitation either as a select committee or as a subcommittee of a reconstituted standing committee. Representative Bill Emerson, former Ranking Minority Member of the disestablished Select Committee on Hunger, questioned the wisdom of the House Leadership in dissolving the Hunger Committee before hunger and malnutrition were alleviated or before changes were made to the committee system to adequately deal with the issue; ``If the existing committee structure is retained in large part, we would do well to consider the creation of an ad hoc committee . . . to deal with hunger issues.'' 30
However, some witnesses addressed jurisdiction from a broader, more theoretical framework. For example, Representative Dan Glickman, Chairman of the Select Intelligence Committee, who described himself as a ``nine term frustrated Member of Congress,'' 31 said on April 22, ``Central to my thinking regarding overhauling the committee system is the idea that jurisdictions must be made clear and unequivocal. I am proposing that we eliminate a number of standing committees and replacing many of their functions with important subcommittees . . . .'' 32 Representative Glickman went on to propose that the Select Intelligence Committee which he chaired could become a subcommittee of a newly merged Armed Services-Foreign Affairs panel.
Several witnesses cautioned that no jurisdictional rearrangements could entirely eliminate overlap. Further, others suggested that jurisdictional tension is beneficial. Representative John Dingell noted on April 29, ``Jurisdictional tension is then oft times a useful device. It is one which tends to create a wholesome and an effective and healthy competition between committees, and the presenting to the House different views that can be debated, discussed within the Rules of the House to ascertain where public policy should go.'' 33
Finally, a number of witnesses cautioned that jurisdictional changes would engender a great deal of internal resistance that could possibly bring down the entire reform package. Former Senator Adlai Stevenson suggested that the Joint Committee learn from his experience in guiding the Senate in 1977 through a committee realignment. On the opening day of testimony, he counseled not to take on the powerful chairmen; ``There was a conscious effort throughout [the Stevenson Committee] . . . to avoid disturbing the barons of the Senate.'' 34
Multiple referrals, the procedure by which a bill is referred to more than one committee for consideration, clearly was a concern to a significant number of witnesses. On May 18, the House Parliamentarian William Brown explained to the Joint Committee that prior to 1974 the process of bill referral to committees was much simpler -- any overlaps in committee jurisdictions were less problematic because referrals were made on the basis of predominant jurisdiction. However, the 1974 reform proposals allowed for multiple referrals in conjunction with clarifications of committee jurisdictions designed to minimize overlaps. While the multiple referral reform was adopted, comprehensive committee jurisdictional realignment was not. As a result, multiple referrals have become commonplace.
The Senate Parliamentarian, Alan Frumin, noted on May 18 that the Senate operates under a system of predominant jurisdiction, so it does not have any problems associated with multiple referrals. Multiple referrals are possible in the Senate if authorized by a joint motion made by the Majority and Minority Leaders, as allowed by the 1977 Stevenson reform, but in practice they are accomplished by unanimous consent. While multiple referrals have long been relatively infrequent in the Senate, the Parliamentarian noted that ``The incidence of multiple referrals has dropped tremendously since the motion was authorized by the Senate's rules to provide just such referrals.'' 35
Generally those who addressed the multiple referral issue noted that the procedure has resulted in ``turf battles'' and unduly delayed the legislative process; these witnesses advocated a reduced use of or even an end to the practice of multiple referrals. As Representative Dan Glickman testified on April 22, ``Let's end the practice of assigning joint referral of bills except when the Speaker personally intervenes . . . . Joint and sequential referrals needlessly slow down consideration of legislation and in many cases they simply stop an idea.'' 36 Representative John LaFalce, Chairman of the Small Business Committee, on May 4 recommended that the use of multiple referrals, which he acknowledged are necessary when jurisdictions collide, incorporate a time constraint. ``If the [multiple referral] is open-ended, you have either gridlock or obstructionism or a combination of the two, and so when there is multiple or sequential referral, once one committee has acted, then it seems to me that that should set in motion a set of dates for other committees to act.'' 37
Committee procedures, such as rolling quorums and rotating chairmanships, received relatively little attention in the testimonies presented on the committee structure. Some attention was given to the concept of making public the attendance record of Members at committee sessions as an incentive to encourage Members to be present; few even suggested that attendance at committee sessions be made mandatory.
Proxy voting, unlike other committee procedures, was addressed frequently. Overwhelmingly, those who addressed this issue recommended that proxy voting be disallowed and predicted that committee attendance would rise as a result. Further, those witnesses in support of the demise of proxy voting were predominantly Republican, although several Democrats were supportive as well. Representative Sonny Montgomery in his May 6 testimony reminded the Joint Committee that his panel, the House Veterans' Affairs Committee, allows no proxies. ``Of the 35 members we have, I would say -- they come because they know we don't have proxies. I would hope . . . this committee would consider no proxies.'' 38 On May 11, Representative Carlos Moorhead, Ranking Minority Member of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, echoed the same sentiments. ``I have long been opposed to proxy voting in committee markups . . . . I would think if we didn't have proxy voting you would see much greater attendance in committees listening to the testimony, listening to the arguments and amendments, and [the Members] would be making their decision based on hard information that they had obtained, rather than prior to the committee meeting, giving their proxy to someone . . . .'' 39
While committee oversight was not addressed by an overwhelming number of witnesses, those who did testified that, notwithstanding rules which encourage each committee to engage in oversight, the oversight function is more often than not disregarded and needs to be strengthened. However, few proposals on how to enhance oversight were proffered. Representative Dan Rostenkowski's statement of April 22 illustrated the general tone of the testimony presented on oversight: ``I also have become concerned in recent years about the amount and quality of oversight work we do in the committees. The House looks to the committees not only for legislation, but also for effective and continuous oversight of the laws and programs within their jurisdiction. This latter responsibility has been all to[o] frequently ignored as members see[k] the glamour of legislation rather than the tedium of oversight.'' 40
Several witnesses defended the existence of select committees for the work they perform in oversight. On May 11, Senator David Pryor, Chairman of the Special Committee on Aging, explained that the Committee needs no legislative authority because its important work lies in ``doing the same hard work, the work of monitoring, the work of oversight, the programs that other committees and ultimately our respective legislative bodies, the House and Senate, pass.'' 41
Legislative service organizations (LSOs) and other informal groups were another topic of testimony of several witnesses. Generally, Chairmen and Ranking Minority Members suggested that these groups required some restraint. Representative Pat Roberts devoted most of his May 6 testimony to alleged financial improprieties of LSOs and ultimately recommended that taxpayer funds no longer be used to finance LSOs. ``The House earlier this year eliminated four select committees citing the limited resources we have available and the lack of legislative authority of these groups. Every criticism of the selects can easily be applied to every LSO,'' he testified. 42
Several other topics, such as conference committees, either were touched on tangentially by one or more witnesses or served as the focus of an entire testimony as in the case of Senator Bob Graham who on May 13 discussed at length the issue of sunshine in legislative proceedings. ``I propose that this [Joint] Committee undertake a thorough review of House and Senate rules governing access by Members, staff and the public to meetings and materials of Congressional Committees.'' 43
FOOTNOTES15 Joint Committee, Committee Structure, April 20, 1993, pp. 6-7.
16 Ibid., April 20, 1993, p. 5.
17 Ibid., April 29, 1993, p. 186.
18 Ibid., May 13, 1993, p. 388.
19 Ibid., April 29, 1993, p. 222.
20 Ibid., May 11, 1993, p. 362.
21 Ibid., April 22, 1993, p. 90.
22 Ibid., April 27, 1993, p. 127.
23 Ibid., May 6, 1993, p. 286.
24 Ibid., May 6, 1993, p. 287.
25 Joint Committee, Floor Deliberations and Scheduling, May 18, 1993, p. 14.
26 Ibid., May 18, 1993, p. 15.
27 Joint Committee, Committee Structure, April 22, 1993, p. 102.
28 Ibid., April 27, 1993, p. 141.
29 Ibid., April 29, 1993, p. 204.
30 Ibid., April 29, 1993, p. 167.
31 Ibid., April 22, 1993, p. 64.
32 Ibid., April 22, 1993, p. 66.
33 Ibid., April 29, 1993, p. 187.
34 Ibid., April 20, 1993, p. 20.
35 Joint Committee, Floor Deliberations and Scheduling, May 18, 1993, p. 5.
36 Joint Committee, Committee Structure, April 22, 1993, p. 65.
37 Ibid., May 4, 1993, p. 237.
38 Ibid., May 6, 1993, p. 289.
39 Ibid., May 11, 1993, p. 342.
40 Ibid., April 22, 1993, p. 89.
41 Ibid., May 11, 1993, p. 349.
42 Ibid., May 6, 1993, p. 319.
43 Ibid., May 13, 1993, p. 376.