ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF REPRESENTATIVE DAVID DREIER

Deliberation is the essential element of democratic government and, as Norm Ornstein of the American Enterprise Institute points out, ``The committee system is the linchpin of the deliberative process.''

Since the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress began its deliberations in January, I have worked to bring about a sensible plan to reform the structure and jurisdiction of the committee system in the House. This is one of the most critical institutional impediments to the ability of the Congress to respond effectively to the contemporary issues facing the Nation. ``Regrettably,'' the New York Times stated, ``neither the Senate members nor the House members addressed the sensitive matter of committee turf.'' This is the Joint Committee's greatest failure.

I am particularly disappointed that the amendment I offered was rejected by a 6-6 party-line vote. Reform of the committee system is not a partisan issue. Sadly, the House Democratic Members of the Joint Committee, under pressure from a strong faction of the Democratic Caucus, chose not to engage in a serious effort on committee reform.

From my perspective on the Rules Committee, and in listening intently to the testimony of hundreds of witnesses before the Joint Committee, I have become convinced that the present structure of the committee system, based on dated assumptions, is wholly inadequate to the task of dealing effectively and comprehensively with new realities. Former Senator William Brock said it best: ``The way (committees) are organized now does not relate to the world in which we live.''

Numerous witnesses, Democrats and Republicans, urged the Joint Committee to make significant changes in the committee system. We were told to be ``bold,'' think ``comprehensively,'' and don't worry about challenging the entrenched powers that thrive under the status quo. That the Joint Committee ignored that advice has more to do with politics-as-usual than with an objective conclusion that no change is necessary.

The Joint Committee devoted more of its time and resources to the issue of committee reform than any other. Eight (22 percent) of the hearings addressed the committee system. Forty-eight (20 percent) of the 243 witnesses testified during the hearings on the committee structure. In addition, more than 84 percent of the Members responding to the survey of the Joint Committee indicated that major improvements are needed in the committee system.

At the request of the Joint Committee, the Congressional Research Service prepared 14 comprehensive options for changing jurisdictions. The committee had an opportunity to examine thoroughly the recommendations offered by the Renewing Congress Project, led by Tom Mann and Norm Ornstein. Yet the committee failed to produce even a modest change in standing committee jurisdiction.

As a result, 52 committees and subcommittee will continue to have responsibility over programs for children and families. The EPA will continue to answer to 90 committees and subcommittees. Some 107 committees and subcommittees will continue to claim some oversight role over the Pentagon. More than 40 committees and subcommittees will continue to have jurisdiction over surface transportation. FEMA oversight, which is so splintered that no single authorizing committee is capable of examining that agency in totality, will continue to hamper disaster relief programs. And we will continue to see conference committees that exceed 200 participants.

I am deeply disappointed that the Joint Committee has not squarely faced these problems. We should not deceive ourselves that mere ``incentive-based'' approaches to the committee system will do the tough job for us. I am concerned that, if we do not modernize the committee system now, the House and Senate may drift for years without resolving this major cause of organizational gridlock.

During markup, I offered a committee reform plan that provides for a complete revision and modernization of Rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives and a reduction in committees and subcommittees. The proposal deletes redundant language in Rule X, clarifies the meaning of jurisdiction, and inserts new terms for contemporary American problems that have heretofore been treated haphazardly and are not now explicitly stated in Rule X.

The amendment reduces the number of standing committees of the House from 22 to 16, and reduces the number of subcommittees from 118 to 96. In and of itself, this would be a significant and important reduction in the Congressional bureaucracy. Additionally, the amendment provides for the abolition of joint referrals; imposes numerical limitations on the size of committees; strictly limits subcommittees to six per committee in most cases; and adopts the tight assignment limitations already part of the reported bill. Many of these structural changes were done at the request of Democratic committee chairmen and others who have long complained about the fluidity of committee sizes and the excessive number of assignments Members carry.

Fundamentally, the amendment consolidates important areas of jurisdiction that have proven problematic for the House. For example, the plan envisions the consolidation of jurisdiction over food and seafood inspection; foreign policy, trade, and international economic policy; health and human resources, including education, health, narcotics rehabilitation, housing, and work incentive programs; environmental policy; transportation; science, energy, and Federal research and development; and financial institutions and regulation, including banking, securities, and insurance.

Each of these areas are important to the Nation. They deserve to be treated in a rational and comprehensive fashion. Few Americans are interested in the politics of jurisdictional disputes among committee chairmen. They are interested in whether or not the Congress is up to the challenge of solving the problems they face on a daily basis. Yet we all understand the truth of the aphorism of our former colleague Representative Donald Rumsfeld that ``process is substance.'' Jurisdiction matters. It is about institutional and political power and how it will be wielded to influence the development of public policy. But the Congress as an institution fails by permitting jurisdictional squabbles to impede the public's business. ``If you look at the committee structure,'' said Vice President Walter Mondale in his testimony, ``a lot of the priorities were set 50, 60, sometimes 100 years ago, and this is not necessarily the same Nation with the same problems as it was then.'' In fact, committee jurisdiction and structure have not changed in any meaningful way in 20 years and jurisdiction has not been amended comprehensively in nearly 50 years.

Some areas of overlap may remain in Rule X as a result of my amendment. I do not think it is possible to eliminate all jurisdictional conflict. But the amendment provides for far less unnecessary and unproductive conflict than the current rule. Reforming Rule X will go a long way toward eliminating the ``gridlock'' that so many Members have condemned.

Many of my colleagues on both sides have contributed their ideas to this plan. I do not assert that all of them would support every aspect of this plan. But I am confident that they would all agree that it is bold, progressive, and comprehensive. It solves many problems in the House. On a more personal level, it creates a committee system and an environment in which Members will have fewer assignments, but those assignments will be more meaningful to them, their constituents, and the Nation.

It is important to note that the early Congresses routinely altered the committee system. They were not wedded to a static view of the world and neither should we. I intend to continue to work in a bipartisan manner with my colleagues on the subject of committee jurisdiction when this reform legislation is considered in the Rules Committee and on the House floor.

David Dreier